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Clean up energy innovation 
 
 
Countries need to agree clean energy definitions and baselines to track essential uplift 
of research investments to decarbonize the world’s energy supplies, write Lucien 
Georgeson, Mark Maslin and Martyn Poessinouw.  
 
 
The Paris climate agreement to keep global average temperature rise below 2˚C requires 
the world to transition rapidly to low carbon energy. Global carbon emissions must peak 
by 2020, reach zero between 2060 and 2080 and become negative by 21001.  
 
Two global partnerships were launched last year to get governments to recognize the 
scale of the transformation and make the huge investments needed. ‘Mission 
Innovation’, a partnership of 20 countries and the European Union2, seeks to double 
annual public clean energy research and development (R&D) funding by 2020, from 
around $15bn to $30bn. The ‘Global Apollo Program’ is a call led by chemist and former 
Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK government Sir David King and colleagues3 for 
developed countries to invest 0.02% of their GDP in public R&D– estimated to add up to 
$15 billion a year globally – to make electricity from renewable sources cheaper than 
that from coal by 2025.  
 
Both Mission Innovation and Global Apollo take different approaches; the former seeks 
to build bottom up agreement between countries based on what they are willing to 
commit, and the latter sought to set the priorities from the top down. There are pros and 
cons to both approaches that have major implications for the expansion of clean energy 
R&D over the next few decades. 
 
 
Need to set proper baselines 
 
The Mission Innovation countries announced the baselines and pledges for clean energy 
R&D in June 2016. The first issue is that each country is free to set their own baselines. 
The IEA publishes many national R&D budget data on national submissions, including 
12 Mission Innovation countries. But only Australia and Canada have used their 
reported clean energy R&D data to set their pledges. The second issue is how countries 
define baselines. Under Mission Innovation, some countries have picked a doubling of 3-
year average spend in public clean energy R&D between 2010 and 2015, others have 
picked 2015 as a baseline, or even 2013 or 2016. Some countries speak of R&D, some of 
RD&D; Research, Development & Demonstration. 
 
Australia is a prime example of how a shifting baseline will change Mission Innovation’s 
clean energy R&D funding. Australia’s Mission Innovation statement gives a target of 
208m AUD, based on doubling government R&D investment into ‘renewable energy, 
energy storage, fuel cells, smart grids, energy efficiency, nuclear and carbon capture and 
storage’ by 2020, based on the 2015 figure of AUD 104m)2. However, according to the 
IEA, Australia spent AUD 152m in 2014, AUD 599m in 2013, AUD 656m in 2012, AUD 
529m in 2011 and AUD 447m in 2010, suggesting R&D funding has declined 
significantly in 2015. Using the available data from the IEA, a 3-year average from 
2012-2014, then doubled (as employed by the EU, France, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and 
the UK) would give a baseline of AUD 469m and a target of AUD 938m.  
 
The plans also reveal another area of inconsistency in the baselines; will Mission 
Innovation deliver an absolute doubling or a doubling above ‘business-as-usual’ R&D 
funding scenarios? For example, the European Union sets its baseline as a doubling on 
baseline value, which is a 3-year average from 2013–2015 of €989, for a clean energy 
R&D target of €1974m in 2020. However, their figures also show that, under a baseline 
scenario, funding would have reached €1493m anyway. Moreover to ascertain each 
countries ambition, we have calculated their Mission Innovation targets as a percentage 
of their GDP (Table 1) and they range from Chile’s 0.0037% to Norway’s 0.0719. This 
also makes it possible to compare with the Global Apollo programme; that uses a top 
down approach suggesting each countries should contribute 0.02% GDP.  Table 1 shows 
this more equal approach produces a radically different target for each country. 
Whether we look at the pledges in absolute or relative terms completely changes how we 





Mission Innovation states that its members represent 80% of public funding for clean 
energy R&D. So the doubling pledges are, for global clean energy, a significant step. But 
is it a problem that R&D funding seems to be concentrated in a few centres? What does 
this mean for getting technologies to where they are needed? This may have 
consequences for what must be the ultimate goal of Mission Innovation; developing 
technologies and deploying them at scale where they are needed. Mission Innovation 
explicitly states that technologies are for national priorities but there needs to be an 
understanding of how ‘technology transfer’ will take place. 
 
 
How to set priorities 
 
The second challenge revealed by the new Mission Innovation pledges is how to set 
priorities for clean energy R&D. The Global Apollo Programme gave three main 
priorities; Solar PV and Concentrating Solar Polar, Electricity Storage and Smart Grids. 
It therefore represented a highly targeted approach with a clear aim; grid parity for 
baseload electricity from renewables3. Its target of $150 billion over 10 years would 
make a huge difference to this aim. Mission Innovation countries have pledged an extra 
Country
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as % of GDP
1 Norway 1130.74 77.90 140 280 0.0719
2 United States 56185.69 3589.40 6415 12830 0.0715
3 Republic of Korea 5730.44 275.38 490 980 0.0712
4 China 39143.93 2196.56 3800 7600 0.0692
5 France 10296.85 484.32 494 989 0.0408
6 Canada 5360.14 310.48 295 590 0.0380
7 Denmark 790.96 59.00 45 90 0.0305
8 Germany 11580.13 671.52 506 1011 0.0301
9 Italy 7105.52 363.16 250 500 0.0275
10 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2105.34 130.64 75 150 0.0230
11 United Kingdom 10140.71 569.86 290 580 0.0204
12 Japan 19080.18 824.66 410 820 0.0199
13 Indonesia 5097.86 171.80 17 150 0.0175
14 Brazil 8588.75 354.52 150 300 0.0169
15 Australia 2882.40 244.78 78 156 0.0127
16 India 17059.36 418.14 72 145 0.0069
17 Sweden 1192.25 98.52 17 33 0.0067
18 United Arab Emirates 534.19 69.10 10 20 0.0058
19 Mexico 6399.71 228.86 21 62 0.0054
20 Chile 1092.06 48.04 4 9 0.0037
European Union 65835.68 3295.44 1111 2218 0.0135
Total 277332.90 14482.08 14690 29513 0.0408
$15 billion a year, covering all aspects of ‘clean energy’, including nuclear power 
(Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Republic of Korea, the UAE, the U.K. and the US) 
and industrial energy efficiency (all countries except China)2. Moreover, the majority of 
countries have not provided a spending breakdown of their baselines and targets by 
sector.  
 
There is a clear issue with how countries define clean energy innovation. Beyond 
renewable energy generation such as wind, solar, hydro, some include energy efficiency, 
nuclear energy, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The latter despite the fact that it 
is controversial and lacks a successful demonstration at an industrial-scale. The 
definition used matters a great deal. Whether you define clean energy as non-polluting 
(‘Clean’), or low environmental impact (‘Green’), or based on carbon emitted (‘Low 
Carbon’), and if you include ‘less bad’ technologies like ‘Clean Coal’, changes the R&D 
budgets radically. For example, the UK claims to have spent £250m over 5 years on 
nuclear R&D, compared to £50m for Smart Grid budgets. £50m a year for nuclear 
represents 25% of the UK’s clean energy R&D baseline under Mission Innovation.  
 
Confusion over the definitions of clean energy have seeped into the targets and pledges 
in Mission Innovation; Germany’s clean energy definition includes renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, storage technologies, grid technologies, CCS, fuel cells and other 
sectors including ‘cleaner fossil energy’. But Germany’s the 3-year average baseline of 
€450m is based on research spend on renewable and energy efficiency technologies. For 
comparison, from data reported to the IEA for 2014 by Germany, €488m was spent on 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, but this does not include €129m spent on CCS, 
Hydrogen & Fuel Cells and Power & Storage (inc. Smart Grids), which would all be 
included in Germany’s definition. Greater transparency and baselines set according to 
shared clean energy definitions and readily-accessible, publicly available data would aid 
Mission Innovation. 
 
If each country in Mission Innovation defines its own clean energy research agenda, the 
programme will be less directed. Less coordination will weaken overall progress towards 
the Paris Agreement goals; and it will mean that R&D will be unable to maximise 
existing research specialities and comparative advantages, such as trying to understand 
how the existing strength of wind power sectors (like Denmark and Germany’s) could 
collaborate on major pre-competitive breakthroughs for the next generation of turbines. 
The Global Apollo Programme called for more directed technical change like this, 
inspired by the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors which mapped 
out pre-competitive research breakthroughs needed to maintain the pace of technology 
development. Mission Innovation has published an ‘Enabling Framework’, but it is non-
binding and stresses the ‘voluntary, bottom up nature’ of programme and the countries’ 
independence to act as they choose, hoping that collaboration will happen more 
‘organically’4. 
 
Without a core definition, countries will be able to ‘increase’ funding by adding new 
sectors to their definitions.  For example, Chile’s definition states ‘considering that there 
is no official definition of this concept, clean energy will be understood as all kinds of 
energy that contribute to reaching this multidimensional development’2. They have 
nominated 6 focus areas, but countries declaring their focus areas now in no way ties 
them to staying with this list. Without proper scrutiny, countries could simply amend 
their definitions to increase reported funding without spending more. ‘Additionality’ has 
been a concern in UNFCCC climate finance debates, and it threatens to interfere with 




How to measure 
 
Mission Innovation allows countries to set their own baselines. There are significant 
changes from the initial launch of the programme in Paris in December, to the 
publication of doubling plans and baselines in June. All but two countries are no longer 
referring to IEA data, when more did in their initial plans. Every other country is using 
their own data, but it is not guaranteed that it is easily available, if it is made public. 
Australia and Canada have used the data reported to the IEA, but based on their own 
definitions, so it is difficult to properly critique their pledges. Choosing their own 
measurements means that commitments vary significantly. Denmark’s target of ‘the 
average funding to the Danish Energy Technology Development and Demonstration 
Programme (EUDP) of the years 2015-2016’2 is a fraction of the clean energy R&D spend 
reported by them in IEA data. We estimate this, based on Denmark’s reported ‘all 
except nuclear’ definition, to be $161.6m. There are other discrepancies that merit 
further consideration; the US’ baseline is considerably higher $6415m than our IEA 
data estimate of $3686.61, and higher than the US’ initial baseline from December of 
$5000m. 
 
But both Mission Innovation and Global Apollo do not consider the role of the private 
R&D in clean energy, which is huge in some sectors. We are able to measure it using 
transactional data. The private sector’s current spending on R&D can be estimated 
using unique transactional spend data, which triangulates transactional and 
operational business data to estimate economic values in areas where government 
statistics are not available, and the average percentage of revenue spent on R&D 
reported by companies for each sector. For both, the data used was developed by 
kMatrix from their ‘Low Carbon and Environmental Goods & Services’ dataset, 
compiled from thousands of sources, with at least 7 different sources excluding outliers 
used to calculate each line of data. In this dataset, on average 85 sources are used for 
each line of data. As many R&D activities are in-house, measuring direct spending on 
R&D (transactions between firms for R&D contracts, for example) can lead to 
inaccuracies, as it does not capture in-house R&D activities for which there is no 
economic ‘footprint’ that can be measured with transactional data. Transactional data 
has also been recently used to explore other harder-to-measure sectors, such city-level 
climate change adaptation spending5. Using transactional data for this study allowed a 
comparison of absolute and relative spending between cities, showing disparities in 
adaptation responses that may be linked to market-based responses to protecting 





The scale of private clean energy R&D is very high, given that an estimate from a study 
for the UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills suggested that 70% of all 
R&D in the UK was privately funded6. Studies on the relationship between public and 
private R&D show that there is no conclusive answer on whether public funding ‘crowds 
out’ or encourages private research. However, if private R&D is anywhere near as high 
as estimated using this method, we would question whether privately-funded R&D is 
currently being spent efficiently and whether it needs to take a more long-term view and 
work alongside public research more effectively.  
 
At a sector level, these data show the differences in priorities between public and 
private funding between technologies already deployed at scale and those that are in the 
developmental phase. For example, comparing IEA public R&D data and private R&D 
data from transactional data, for the US the ratio of public:private R&D spend ranges 
from 1:0.56 for CCS to 1:25 for renewable energy. This suggests that R&D challenges 
across clean energy sectors are not uniform. Analysing this data could help countries to 
better direct focus into areas that are currently under-invested in private R&D such as 
those with low public:private ratios from our comparisons, like CCS or Hydrogen & Fuel 
Cells, and thus need more public R&D to get to new commercialisable technologies. 
Public R&D is not just ‘blue sky’ research but also can shape markets and drive 
innovation where the private sector is too risk averse7. The ‘Breakthrough Coalition’, a 
group of investors who pledged to support technologies arising from Mission Innovation 
with ‘patient capital’ (making a long term commitment to important investments, 
instead of investing in companies for the quickest profit) was launched alongside 
Mission Innovation8. This gives signals to the Breakthrough Coalition about where they 
need to target their investments to meet their commitment and provide useful, patient 
capital, not make the quickest IPO exits.  
 
As Prof Mazzucato7, an economist, put its, there needs to be a symbiotic, not parasitic, 
relationship between state-funded R&D and the private sector. Not only do we need to 
leverage public funds to better direct and set priorities in private R&D, also public R&D 
needs to drive greater collaboration between public, transformative, early stage research 
and private sector research to marketization. There has to be some overlap and benefit 
to the State for developing technology ultimately commercialised by the private sector. 
Similarly, the private sector has to be ready to deliver in these new markets, which also 
needs the right financial mechanisms. But Mission Innovations baselines and priorities 
are set by national priorities and business-as-usual, so it threatens to less connected, 





Mission Innovation has done what the Global Apollo Program has not yet managed to 
do: get countries to publicly sign up to an R&D pledge for clean energy. But for Mission 
Innovation to be a success and to make it more than a political statement, more 
governments must sign up and all countries need to meet their 2020 pledges based on 
their actual research spend using a fair baseline and sensible, shared definition of clean 
energy innovation. 
 
Governments need to work out how to direct their funding, both allowing for ‘blue sky’ 
research for radical new technologies and targeted research to drive technological 
change with commercial potential. But first, Mission Innovation needs baseline figures, 
and more agreement about what clean energy means. Here, it might follow some of the 
Global Apollo Program’s target-setting approaches, combined with the political buy-in 
and momentum at the highest level that Mission Innovation has achieved. 
 
We urge governments to use studies of transactional data such as ours to examine what 
private R&D offers to the clean energy equation and the relationship between public 
and private R&D. Such data could aid governments to direct the additional R&D from 
their pledges into the areas that are currently underdeveloped. It could aid the 
commercialisation that the private sector is not, despite its grandstanding, currently 
achieving. 
 
The complete decarbonisation of the global economy in 40-60 years is a massive 
undertaking that requires equally massive responses. It could happen: in 1800, the 
British Navy took up over 25% of per capita government expenditure to establish 
Britain as the world’s major naval power9; the US Interstate Highway System cost $560 
billion (adjusted to 2007 dollars) and took 37 years to construct10. A similarly huge, 
genuinely global commitment to clean energy R&D is required if global climate change 
is to be kept to below 2˚C.  
 
 
Lucien Georgeson1*, Mark Maslin1, Martyn Poessinouw1,2 
1 Department of Geography, University College London, Pearson Building, Gower 
Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK 







Table 1: Public R&D targets under the Global Apollo Programme and Mission 
Innovation and Private R&D spend for 2014/15 for the 20 Mission Innovation Countries 
and the European Union. Countries are ranked by their Mission Innovation 
Commitment as a percentage of GDP. The European Union is not ranked as its 
commitment, based on the EU budget, is not comparable. 
 
Figure 1: Public and Private R&D as a percentage of GDP in the 20 Mission Innovation 
Countries. Public R&D is presented as the target for public clean energy R&D made by 
each country in their Mission Innovation commitment. Private R&D figures are derived 
from sale figures from the kMatrix Low Carbon & Environmental Goods & Services 
(LCEGS) dataset, and average reported % of sales used for R&D for each subsector, 
covering categories that match the Mission Innovation clean energy sectors as closely as 
possible. LCEGS data covers 2014/15 financial year and was converted to USD at the 
US Treasury historic rate from the closest date. GDP figures used in calculations are 
2015 estimates of GDP at current prices in USD from the International Monetary 
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